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MB-0789

Automated Custom source avoids native unserialize calls

MB-C03 Secure Coding Practices Medium

Collected custom PHP/PHTML contains no direct unqualified or fully-qualified global unserialize call, irrespective of allowed_classes options. Indirect calls and function aliases yield UNKNOWN. Other serializers remain outside this syntax policy. Scope is completely collected app/code PHP/PHTML; missing, unreadable, oversized, linked, malformed or truncated eligible input prevents a clean PASS.

Overview

Collected custom PHP/PHTML contains no direct unqualified or fully-qualified global unserialize call, irrespective of allowed_classes options. Indirect calls and function aliases yield UNKNOWN. Other serializers remain outside this syntax policy. Scope is completely collected app/code PHP/PHTML; missing, unreadable, oversized, linked, malformed or truncated eligible input prevents a clean PASS.

Why it Matters

PHP object deserialization is complex enough that a project may choose to forbid its native entrypoint altogether. The strict rule is straightforward to review without judging every serialized class graph.

An alternative data format still needs schema validation and appropriate trust handling.

Verification Steps

Manual Verification

  1. Review real global unserialize calls in collected app/code PHP/PHTML, including fully qualified calls.
  2. Identify aliases and indirect call ambiguity.
  3. Review any replacement serializer's input validation separately.

Command / Review Sample

// Data-format illustration:
$data = json_decode($payload, true, 512, JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR);
// Validate the resulting schema before use.

Use the assessed Magento project and the appropriate application or read-only review account. Replace example hosts, paths and identifiers with the assessment scope; configuration and source fragments are illustrative.

Remediation / Fix Guidance

  1. Inspect each named call and argument at the reported file/line. Trace input origin, receiver identity, authorization and output use before deciding whether to replace the API or document an approved exception to this explicit coding policy.
  2. Test the affected behavior and its real trust boundary. Replacing an API or wrapping a call does not by itself validate input or remove an exploit path.
  3. Rerun MB-0789 against the same release, profile and relevant file/key/package scope; compare the new evidence and inspect any independent collection gaps.

Examples

Illustrative examples only. Interpret them within the current revision criterion above; missing collection evidence is unresolved, never PASS.

Fail Example

$data = unserialize($payload, ['allowed_classes' => false]);
// Still prohibited by this strict native-call policy.

Pass Example

$data = json_decode($payload, true, 512, JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR);
// Independently validate the decoded schema.

Scope and Evidence Limits

Rule revision: 1. Target modes: LOCAL.

Collected custom PHP/PHTML contains no direct unqualified or fully-qualified global unserialize call, irrespective of allowed_classes options. Indirect calls and function aliases yield UNKNOWN. Other serializers remain outside this syntax policy. Scope is completely collected app/code PHP/PHTML; missing, unreadable, oversized, linked, malformed or truncated eligible input prevents a clean PASS.

Exact opt-in coding policy, not a finding of confirmed exploitability or proof of the broader historical requirement. Runtime adapters, dependencies, generated code and files outside app/code remain outside this predicate.

Catalog coverage describes implementation capability, not a scan outcome. An incomplete manual review cannot establish that the criterion is satisfied.

References